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The present paper develops a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations and 
endogenous fertility in order to analyze the interaction between public policy and household 
labor supply and fertility decisions. The model's benchmark equilibrium reflects the current 
family policy consisting of joint taxation of married couples, monetary transfers and in-kind 
benefits which reduce the time cost of children. Then we simulate alternative reforms of the 
tax and the child benefit system and analyze the long-run impact on fertility and female labor 
supply. Our simulations indicate three central results: First, policies which simply increase the 
family budget either via higher transfers (direct or in-kind) or via family splitting increase 
fertility but reduce female employment. Second, increasing tax revenues due to the 
introduction of individual taxation would increase female employment but reduce fertility. 
Third, revenue neutral policies such as a reform of the benefit structure or a move towards 
individual taxation combined with an increase in in-kind benefits may achieve both goals and 
therefore yield significant welfare gains. 
JEL-Code: J120, J220. 
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During the past decades most industrialized countries of the Western world have experienced
declining fertility rates combined with an increase in female labor market participation (FLMP).
Within OECD countries total fertility rates1 (TFR) decreased from above 2.6 children per
woman in 1970 to 1.6 children in 2006, see OECD (2009a). In Germany this negative trend was
even stronger. In the old West German states the TFR decreased from its peak of 2.5 children
per woman in the mid-1960s to 1.3 children in the mid-1980s (StaBu, 2007). The decline did
not turn out to be so signi¯cant in the former German Democratic Republic, so that the TFR
has stayed at about 1.4 children per woman since the German reuni¯cation. During the last
three decades, the mean age of mothers at ¯rst childbirth increased, on average from 23.8 to
27.7 years. Although the postponement of ¯rst childbirth is very signi¯cant with an increase
of over one year per decade, cohort fertility data indicates that recuperation is only partial at
higher ages. Since women give fewer birth to children and later in life, it seems natural that
they would increase their share in the labor force at the same time. As documented by OECD
(1995, 2009b) participation rates of prime-age women rose signi¯cantly within OECD countries
from 48.3 percent in 1974 to 61.3 percent in 2008. The inverse relationship between fertility and
FLMP can also be observed in the cross-section data with respect to the individual skill level.
For example, in 2007 low-skilled women in Germany had a participation rate of 57 percent
and on average 1.9 children, whereas high-skilled women had a higher participation rate (85
percent) and on average only 1.1 children (StaBu, 2009b,c).
At ¯rst sight, both trends could be explained quite well by Becker's (1965) seminal work on
household time allocation. According to this model the rising female earnings power has induced
a fertility decline and an increase in female employment because the positive income e®ects on
fertility and leisure demand were dominated by negative substitution e®ects due to the increased
opportunity cost of child bearing and leisure. This preference-based theory ¯ts quite well
with empirical studies that document the positive correlation between women's education and
their labor market participation (OECD, 2009b), postponed maternity (Gustafsson and Kalwij,
2006) and childlessness (Hoem, Neyer and Andersson, 2006). However, the Beckerian theory
requires a speci¯c preference structure that assures that the substitution e®ect dominates as
income rises. For example, if preferences are homothetic, the income e®ect and the substitution
e®ect cancel one another. Becker's argument also generates testable predictions that appear
inconsistent with the empirical evidence. As pointed out by Galor (2010), the demographic
transition across Western Europe in the 19th century does not support a negative correlation
between income and fertility. In addition, recent time series data of OECD countries indicates
1The average number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if she were to pass
through her childbearing years conforming to the age-speci¯c fertility rates of a given year.
1a much more complex relationship between women's fertility and labor supply decisions. First,
the trend that women give birth to fewer children and later in life is not uniform among all
OECD countries. In countries such as Belgium, France, the Scandinavian countries and the
United States the TFR has either remained at or has recently recovered to above 1.8 children
per woman, while in countries such as Germany, Italy or Spain fertility rates have remained
constant below 1.4 children for many years. Second, several recent studies (Ahn and Mira,
2002; Del Boca, Pasqua and Pronzato, 2009) have stressed that across many OECD countries
the relationship between female employment and fertility has changed over the last 25 years.
While in 1980 there was a clear negative correlation between female employment and total
fertility rates, in 2005 some OECD countries with higher rates of female employment also had
relatively high birth rates, so that the correlation in these countries is now positive. Finally,
the relation between education and fertility has changed its sign recently as well. In the past,
OECD countries with higher rates of women's enrollment in tertiary education were also those
featuring lower fertility rates. In the 1990s, however, countries with higher women's education
also reported higher fertility rates (d'Addio and d'Ercola, 2005).
Since many industrialized countries are facing an enormous pressure due to the ageing pop-
ulation and the decline in population size, increasing TFRs and FLMPs jointly is extremely
important for future labor markets and social security systems. Not surprisingly, family policy
is attracting increasing public attention while at the same time a substantial amount of both
theoretical and empirical research aims to uncover the central determinants of a woman's joint
childbearing and labor supply decisions. Extending the overlapping generations model of Ga-
lor and Weil (1996), Martinez and Iza (2004) focus on labor market conditions, technological
change and private child care provisions in order to explain the interaction between di®erential
birth rates and women's labor supply in a growing economy. On the other hand, Apps and
Rees (2004) discuss di®erences in the public child care systems and family taxation in order to
explain the described heterogeneity in fertility rates and labor market outcomes across coun-
tries. Recent empirical studies by BjÄ orklund (2006), Del Boca et al. (2009), Kalwij (2009),
Laroque and Salanie (2004) and Lalive and ZweimÄ uller (2009) indicate that various policies
that reduced the opportunity cost of children were indeed successful in increasing fertility rates
and labor market participation for women. Another strand of the literature has focussed on the
di®erential fertility of di®erent educational groups. Since intergenerational educational mobility
is fairly low (Woessmann, 2008), de la Croix and Doepke (2003) develop a model in which per-
sistent intragenerational fertility di®erences worsen the income distribution and reduce future
economic growth.
The present study is related to the recent literature of calibrated models on the economics
of the family. In this context, Caucutt, Guner and Knowles (2002), Greenwood, Guner and
Knowles (2003) or Guner and Knowles (2009) distinguish two sexes and analyze the interaction
2between marital status, employment, childbearing and human capital investment in a three-
stage decision process. In these models women's fertility declines in their educational level
since children are time intensive and thus more costly for women with high productivity. The
models are applied to analyze the impact of changes in women's productivity or of di®erent
government policies on marriage, fertility, employment, education and the overall income dis-
tribution. Erosa, Fuster and Restuccia (2002) abstract from the marital decision in order to
study the impact of fertility and labor market decisions on human capital accumulation in a
search theoretic framework with job mobility and di®erent job qualities. The study ¯nds that
fertility decisions, which generate long lasting employment and wage e®ects, mainly explain the
observed gender wage gap in the U.S. while tenure capital plays only a minor role. Da Rocha
and Fuster (2006) apply a similar search model but they consider an overlapping generations
economy where only adult females make childbirth and labor market decisions. Due to labor
market frictions the model is able to generate the observed positive correlation between fer-
tility and employment among OECD countries mentioned above. All studies discussed so far
are partial equilibria since they mainly consider the household side, abstract from capital ac-
cumulation, public budgets and endogenous factor price repercussions. In contrast, the present
study builds on Conesa (2000) or Doepke, Hazan and Maoz (2008) who abstract from labor
market search and analyze the household's fertility and women's labor supply decisions within
a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Conesa (2000) focusses on intragenerational di®er-
ences in fertility behavior and replicates the delayed childbirth and lower birth rates of higher
educated women. Doepke et al. (2008) consider only one representative household per cohort
and generate a baby boom by restricting labor market access for women. However, both studies
mostly neglect the government sector. This is where the present study steps in. In particular,
we analyze reform options for child bene¯ts and family taxation in Germany, since this country
has an extremely negative past record regarding TFRs and FLMPs. Our simulation results
show that it is possible to increase fertility and female employment rates simultaneously if the
government increases the supply of child care facilities for children of all ages. The paper also
highlights the positive e®ects of a move towards individual taxation. Although such a reform is
currently precluded by German constitutional law, it is important to understand and quantify
the adverse consequences of the present system of joint taxation.
The next section motivates the quantitative approach by considering a simple static model of
fertility choice. Section 3 describes the structure of the simulation model. Section 4 explains
the calibration and simulation design. Finally, section 5 presents the numerical results and
section 6 o®ers some concluding remarks.
32 The static model of fertility choice
In order to discuss some central mechanisms that motivate our quantitative approach, this
section introduces the most basic model of fertility choice in which children provide direct
utility bene¯ts.2 Households maximize utility subject to a budget constraint where women
divide their time endowment (normalized to unity) into working and child-rearing. Assuming















s.t. c + b0n = w(1 ¡ b1n)
where c and n denote consumption and the number of children, respectively. The parameters
®c and ®n as well as the substitution elasticity ½ determine the preference structure, w de¯nes
the wage and b0;b1 the costs of children in terms of money and time. Note that family policy
intends to reduce the costs of children either via b0 (for example by direct transfers per child)
or indirectly via b1 (for example by providing subsidized child care). The explicit solution for







+ b0 + wb1
:
As it turns out, a clearly negative relationship between income and fertility could be generated
by ignoring monetary costs of children (b0 = 0) and setting ½ > 1. If only time costs of children
matter then high-wage families face higher opportunity costs of having children. With a high
elasticity of substitution between children and consumption, the substitution e®ect dominates
so that n(w) decreases, as in the data. It is also obvious that family policy which reduces b0
and/or b1 is able to increase the fertility rate.
However, one has to keep in mind that ¯nancing of family policy reduces net income which may
either counteract or strengthen the e®ects on fertility of the policy instruments. In addition,
changes in the cost parameters may a®ect fertility decisions of various income classes di®erently.
While direct payments per child may have a strong income e®ect on low-skilled households,
they have only a negligible impact on high-skilled parents. Quite the opposite applies to family
policy instruments that reduce the time costs of children. The simple static model also neglects
leisure demand and the interaction between the fertility choice and female labor supply decision.
Although the utility from leisure consumption could also be considered in the static model, the
labor supply decision in the present context has to account for the timing of births and the
2See Jones, Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2010) for a discussion of such static fertility models. Alternatively,
children may also be viewed as an investment providing old-age security, see Boldrin and Jones (2002).
4accumulation and depreciation of female human capital during child rearing. Consequently,
the joint fertility and labor supply decision has to be analyzed in a dynamic framework. In
such a setup it is also possible to quantify the macroeconomic growth e®ects resulting from the
adjusted fertility pattern. The next section discusses the structure of such a simulation model.
3 The dynamic model economy
3.1 Demographics and intracohort heterogeneity
We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations of married couples who live
for J periods indexed by adult ages j 2 J = f1;:::;Jg. The life cycle of a representative
household is described in Figure 1. We assume that both adult members of the household
belong to the same skill level s 2 S = f1;:::;Sg. Men work continuously until age JR ¡ 1,
afterwards they retire. All woman retire at the same age as men, but they can choose in
every period before retirement how much they work. Apart from the labor supply and savings
decision, couples face the decision about the number and timing of their children. Women can
give birth to children until age JF. We abstract from twins, triplets etc., so that only one child
per period can be born. Consequently, the total number of children of the age-j household is
nj 2 N = f0;:::;JFg. Parents raise their children for JK periods, so that ki 2 J indicates the
age of the i-indexed child of the household. After birth, all children of a cohort are identical
until they reach adulthood.















Our model only considers long-run equilibria so that we can omit a time index for all variables.
It is solved recursively and an age-j household faces the state vector
zj = (s;aj;Dj); (1)
where aj 2 A = [0;1) de¯nes the household's assets held at the beginning of age j. The vector
Dj = (k1;:::;knj) 2 N J with 0 · k1 · knj contains the demographic characteristics of all
children of the household. More speci¯cally, k1 and knj denote the age of the youngest and
5the oldest child of the age-j household, respectively. Given Dj we can compute the number of
children currently living in the household mj · nj (i.e. those children where ki · JK) or the
number of children with ages equal to or less than 6 years (m6j). Finally, m1j 2 f0;1g indicates
whether the age-j household currently has a newborn child or not.
Each age-j cohort is fragmented into subgroups »(zj), according to the initial distribution (i.e.
at j = 1), the fertility process and optimal individual decisions. Let X(zj) be the corresponding
cumulated measure to »(zj). Hence,
Z
C
dX(zj) = 1; for all j 2 J
must hold, as »(zj) is not a®ected by cohort sizes but only gives densities within cohorts. For
the sake of simpli¯cation, we de¯ne C = S £ A £ N J as the set of states. Let Nj denote the








measures the aggregate number of children living in households while the endogenous (native)











where we have normalized the number of the youngest households to unity, i.e. N1 = 1. In
order to have zero or positive population growth, we add an exogenous population growth rate
from immigration ¹ ´ so that in equilibrium cohort numbers can be computed from
Nj = (1 + ´ + ¹ ´)Nj¡1: (4)
In the following, we will omit the state indices zj for every variable whenever possible. Agents
are then only distinguished according to their age j.
3.2 The households' problem
Since we consider the steady state, households maximize utility at the initial age choosing
a contingent plan for consumption, labor supply, the number of children and the timing of
births. Following Conesa (2000), in every period during the fertile years the household decides
whether to have an additional child in the subsequent period or not. Conditional on having
decided to have a newborn next period, this event will only happen with a certain probability.
Our model assumes a preference structure that is represented by a time-separable, nested CES
6utility function. Consequently, the problem can be written recursively so that the household
at age j and state zj solves
V (zj) = max
cj;`j;^ nj
½









by choosing per capita consumption of goods cj, leisure consumption of the mother `j and the
family size ^ nj. With nj being the number of children, we de¯ne ^ nj = 2 + nj. Expected utility
in future periods is discounted by ¯ and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is de¯ned
by °. The expectation operator E in (5) indicates that future utilities are computed over the
distribution of Dj+1.
Households maximize (5) subject to the budget constraint (6),
aj+1 = (1 + r)aj + (1 ¡ ¿)wj + mjb
c ¡ m6jpcl
f
j + pj ¡ T(yj) ¡ (1 + ¿c)f(mj)cj (6)
with a1 = aJ+1 = 0. The constraint (6) re°ects how children a®ect resources of the family













1 nj = mj = 0
(1 ¡ ±c)e
f
j¡1 nj;mj > 0
e
f
j¡1 nj > 0;mj = 0
during their working periods. Given the wage rate for e®ective labor w and ej as the age-j
productivity, labor supply of the husband lh is exogenously predetermined3 while the working
time of the mother l
f
j is endogenously chosen given the husband's income, and the number of
children in the household. We assume that children in the household reduce productivity of the
mother where ±c measures the depreciation rate which determines the depreciation factor e
f
j.




j + ª(Dj) + `j (7)
The time required for childcare measured by the function ª(¢) depends on the age structure of
children since we assume { following Da Rocha and Fuster (2006) or Doepke et al. (2008) {
that younger children are more time intensive than older children. Depending on the number
of children, households may also receive direct monetary support bc such as child bene¯ts or
parental leave bene¯ts per child. In addition, they have to pay a fee of pc per (younger than six
year) child for external child care during the time the mother is working.4 Households have to
3We do not consider this as a strong assumption given the large body of empirical evidence suggesting very
limited reaction of men's labor supply to tax changes, see Heckman (1993) or Eissa and Hoynes (2004).
4Of course, public policy instruments are oversimpli¯ed. In Germany, the price paid for non-parental child
care may vary signi¯cantly with the income level of households and the value of parental leave bene¯ts depends
on the mother's income from working previous to the child's birth.
7pay social security contributions at a rate ¿ on gross family income, income taxes that depend
on (family-size related) taxable income yj, and receive public pensions pj during retirement.
Finally, the price of consumption goods cj includes consumption taxes ¿c and total consumption
of the household is given by multiplying per capita consumption with f(mj) = 1:7+0:5mj, see
Conesa (2000).
3.3 Instantaneous utility and the decision to have children
Similarly to Conesa (2000) or Doepke et al. (2008) we de¯ne the period utility function by

















where ®1 denotes the coe±cient of consumption in the sub-utility function and ½ de¯nes the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure on the one hand and
family size on the other hand, while ®2 de¯nes the age-independent preference parameter for
family size.
The fertility decision is modeled similarly to the college choice in Heckman, Lochner and Taber
(1998). In every period during fertile years j < JF each household has to decide whether to
have one additional child in the subsequent period or not. The welfare change of having an





¡ 1 ¡ ²z
where V (z1
j) and V (z0
j) measure utilities from having an additional child or not, respectively.
Additional non-pecuniary (i.e. psychological) gains or costs from additional children, which
are not observed by the model, are captured by ²z » N(0;¾2). We assume that the latter
are normally distributed within each skill class with mean zero and variance ¾2. Due to the



















where ©0;¾2 de¯nes the cumulative normal distribution function with mean zero and variance
¾2. Conditional on having decided to have a baby next period, this event will happen with
probability 0 · ¼ · 1. Following Conesa (2000), we assume that fertility uncertainty is
independent of age and skill classes during fertile ages. Note that there is no uncertainty if the
household decides not to have a newborn.
83.4 The production side
Firms in this economy use capital and labor to produce a single good according to a Cobb-
Douglas production technology Y = µK"L1¡" where Y;K and L are aggregate output, capital
and labor, respectively, " is capital's share in production and µ de¯nes a technology parameter.
Capital depreciates at a rate ±k. Firms maximize pro¯ts, renting capital and hiring labor from
households such that net marginal products equal r, the interest rate for capital, and w, the
wage rate for e®ective labor.
3.5 The government sector
Our model distinguishes between the general government budget and the pension system. In
each period of the long-run equilibrium, the government issues new debt (´+ ¹ ´)BG and collects
taxes from households in order to ¯nance general government expenditure G (which is ¯xed
per capita), in-kind bene¯ts or services for families Gc and direct monetary support Mbc to
families, as well as interest payments on its debt, i.e.
(´ + ¹ ´)BG + T = G + Gc + Mb
c + rBG; (9)
where T de¯nes tax revenues from income and consumption taxation







with C as aggregate consumption. We assume that contributions to public pensions are ex-
empted from income tax while bene¯ts are fully taxed. Consequently, taxable income yj is
computed from gross labor income net of pension contributions, capital income and { after
retirement { public pensions, i.e.
yj = (1 ¡ ¿)wj + raj + pj: (11)
Given taxable income, we apply the German progressive tax code of the year 2005. In-kind
bene¯ts for families are modeled as a a ¯xed cost per child · that covers childcare institutions
and the provision of schools and universities minus payments of parents for public childcare,
i.e.









In each period, we assume a ¯xed debt to output ratio and balance the public budget by
adjusting the consumption tax rate.
9Finally, the pension system pays old-age bene¯ts and collects payroll contributions from wage
income. Pension bene¯ts pj of a retiree household at age j ¸ JR in a speci¯c year are uniform
across age and skill classes and computed as a ¯xed replacement rate of average income ¹ w. Since









where L denotes aggregate labor supply de¯ned in (15) below.
3.6 Equilibrium conditions
Our initial long-run equilibrium is computed in a closed economy so that factor prices are
endogenous and the trade balance is zero. Then we implement a policy reform and compute
the resulting long-run equilibrium where we keep the factor prices of the initial steady state
constant.
In addition to factor prices being equal to marginal products, we need households to maximize
(5) with respect to the respective constraints (6) and (7), an invariant measure of households
» over the whole state space and market clearance for the capital, labor and goods market in
the closed or small open economy:






















Y = C + G + (´ + ¹ ´ + ±k)K + TB; (16)
where BF measures foreign debt and TB denotes the trade balance.
4 Calibration of the initial equilibrium
4.1 Parameterizing the model
Table 1 reports the central parameters of the model. In order to reduce computational time,
each model period covers two years. Therefore, children are at home until age 19 (JK = 10),
then they start adult life at age 20 (j = 1), women can have children until age 36 (JF = 8),
households are forced to retire at age 66 (JR = 23) and face a life span of 80 years (J = 30).
10Since we adjust in our initial equilibrium the exogenous growth rate of households in order to
have zero growth (i.e. ¹ ´ = ¡´), this cohort structure yields a quite realistic dependency ratio
between pensioners and working cohorts of 36.4 percent.
Table 1: Parameter selection
Technology/
Demographic Preference Budget Government
parameters parameters parameters parameters
J = 30 ° = 0:5 µ = 1:17 BG=Y = 0:6
JR = 23 ®1 = 0:5 " = 0:3 T(y) see text
JF = 8 ½ = 0:65 ±k = 0:122 pc = 0:2
JK = 10 ®2 = 0:35 lh = 0:4 · = 0:065 ¹ w
S = 3 ¯ = 1:0 ±c see text bc = 0:065 ¹ w
¼ = 0:8 ª(Dj) see text p = 0:55 ¹ w
ej see text
We distinguish S = 3 educational classes and assume that households only marry within the
same skill-class. Based on data estimated from German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) of the
years 1995-2007 we assume that 25, 55 and 20 percent of the cohort are low-, middle- and
high-skilled, respectively. These shares also ¯t in quite well with the shares reported in StaBu
(2009a, 26). SOEP data is also used to compute the e±ciency pro¯les ej for skill classes across
the life-cycle.5 Finally, following Conesa (2000) we assume that 80 percent of those households
that wish to have a child will receive one.
With respect to the preference parameters, we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution °
as well as the consumption preference in the Cobb-Douglas sub-utility function ®1 to 0.5. The
chosen value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is within the range of commonly
used estimates, see the discussion in _ Imrohoro¸ glu and Kitao (2009, p.871). The consumption
preference parameter yields quite realistic female labor force participation rates, see Table 3
below. The fertility choice parameters ½ and ®2 are calibrated such that the model is consistent
with completed fertility and timing of fertility as observed in the data. As explained above,
the higher the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between ordinary utility (from goods
and leisure consumption) and family size ½, the larger is the di®erence in completed fertility
between the high-skilled and the low-skilled class. The preference for family size ®2 determines
the level of completed fertility. We set ½ at 0.65 and ®2 at 0.35, which yields both the negative
relationship between income and children and the target level for the total fertility rate in the
initial equilibrium. Finally, in order to calibrate a realistic capital to output ratio, the discount
5The SOEP data base is described in Wagner, Frick and Schupp (2007). See Fehr, Kallweit and Kindermann
(2009) for detailed explanations of the estimation procedure and results.
11factor is set at 1.0.
With respect to technology parameters we specify the general factor productivity µ = 1:17 in
order to normalize labor income and set the capital share in production " at 0.3. The annual
depreciation rate for capital is set at 5.9 percent which yields a periodic depreciation rate of
±k = 0:122. Husbands are assumed to work 40 percent of their time endowment which is typ-
ically assumed in quantitative studies, see Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987). The depreciation
of women's productivity depends on the respective skill level. We assume a one percent de-
preciation for low-skilled mothers and a two percent depreciation for middle- and high-skilled
mothers. These ¯gures are somewhere between the depreciation rates applied by Da Rocha and
Fuster (2006) and Doepke et al. (2008). Finally, we assume that the time costs ª(Dj) decrease
linearly with age of children. Every mother spends 25 percent of the time endowment with a
newborn, 8 percent with every child below school age and 5 percent with every remaining child.
These ¯gures are in line with Da Rocha and Fuster (2006).
With respect to the government sector we assume a debt-to-output ratio of 60 percent and
that taxation of gross income (from labor, capital and pensions) is close to the current German
income tax code and the marginal tax rate schedule T05 which was introduced in 2005. Con-
sequently, given taxable income yj of the household and applying the income splitting method,
the marginal tax rate rises linearly after the basic allowance of 16.600 e from 15 percent to
a maximum of 42 percent when yj passes 104.000 e. In addition, we also account for the
solidarity surcharge of 5.2 percent so that we get
T(yj) = 1:052 £ 2 £ T05(yj=2):
In the initial equilibrium we set pc = 0:2, which yields a realistic revenue of private fees to public
childcare and is also close to the ¯gures used by Da Rocha and Fuster (2006). In addition, we
assume that 6.5 percent of average income is transferred as child bene¯ts. This ¯gure is quite
realistic for Germany, where roughly 2.000 e is paid per child per annum and average income
amounts to roughly 30.000 e. The same ¯gure is also assumed for in-kind bene¯ts per capita.
Finally, we assume that pensions of each household amount to 55 percent of average wages and
¯x the per capita costs of general public consumption (G) in order to get realistic ¯gures in our
benchmark.
4.2 The initial equilibrium
Table 2 and Figure 2 report some central indices of the calibrated benchmark equilibrium and
the respective ¯gures for Germany in 2007/2008. The upper part of Table 2 shows that the
model's total fertility rate and mean age at childbirth match the German situation quite well.
12However, ¯rst child birth is too late in the model compared to reality. Figure 2 compares
the actual and the model's distribution of family sizes at age 36-38 (i.e. when childbirth is
completed). Our model replicates the fact that about 50 percent of German families have
either one or no child. However, the fraction of families without children is higher in reality
compared to the model. Families with more than one child are captured by the model quite
well. With respect to the di®erent skill classes our model re°ects the fact that fertility rates
decrease with income (i.e. skill level). As one can see in Figure 2 the shares of childless families
increase and the shares of families with three or more children decrease with the skill level. As
shown by Table 2, the skill-speci¯c fertility rates are realistic.




Total fertility rate (TFR) 1.46 1.38b
Total mean age at childbirth (in years) 29.9 29.8b
Total mean age at ¯rst child (in years) 27.9 26.1c
Skill-speci¯c fertility rates 1.96/1.34/1.11 1.94/1.35/1.14c
Skill-speci¯c share of childless (in %) 8/21/27 11/16/26c
Government indicators (% of GDP)
In-kind bene¯ts and services 3.0 3.0d
Direct monetary support 3.0 3.0d
General government expenditure 15.1 15.0
Interest payments 3.1 2.7
Tax revenues 24.2 22.5
Pension bene¯ts 13.5 11.5
Pension contribution rate (in %) 19.9 19.9
Consumption tax rate (in %) 19.0 {
Other benchmark coe±cients
Skill-speci¯c mean age at ¯rst child (in years) 27.4/28.2/27.9 {
Capital-output ratio 2.8 3.3
Interest rate p.a. (in %) 5.2 {
(Native) Population growth rate p.a. (in %) -1.5 {
Source: aIdW (2009), bStaBu(2009a), cStaBu (2009b), dRosenschon (2006).
With respect to the calibration of family policy measures, we follow the comprehensive study
of Rosenschon (2006), where overall public expenditures for family in Germany accumulate
to 10.7 percent of GDP. However, many family transfer instruments, which are listed there,
are not taken into account by the model. With respect to in-kind transfers such as public
childcare services and schools, Rosenschon (2006) reports a ¯gure of roughly 3 percent of GDP.
In addition, direct transfers to families including child bene¯ts and parental leave bene¯ts also


















add up to roughly 3 percent of GDP. The remaining ¯gures are calibrated in order to arrive
at a realistic government tax structure and macroeconomic situation. We ¯x public debt to
60 percent of GDP, so that annual interest payments amount to 3.1 percent of GDP. Since we
abstract from growth and de¯cit ¯nancing, tax revenues add up to 24.2 percent of GDP. Private
consumption amounts to 64.7 percent of GDP and the endogenous consumption tax rate is 19
percent, so that consumption tax revenues are slightly higher than income tax revenues. The
average and marginal tax rate of the latter across the total population are 8.9 and 22.6 percent,
respectively. However, skill-speci¯c average income tax rates increase from 2.1 to 9.1 and 17.4
percent and marginal income tax rates increase from 13.3 to 23.7 and 32.0 percent. We also
match the current pension contribution rate in Germany, but pension bene¯ts are too high in
the model. Note that due to the low fertility rate we end up with a negative native population
growth rate of 1.5 percent. In the initial equilibrium we assume that immigration completely
neutralizes this e®ect so that total population growth is zero.
Table 3 reports the participation rates of women in the model and in the German labor force.
We assume that women are participating in the labor market when they work more than ¯ve
percent of their time endowment. Given this de¯nition, our model replicates the situation of
women in the German labor market quite well. First, we match the average participation rate
of 69.7 percent almost perfectly. Second, as in reality, participation rates increase with skill
level. Third, the model also yields a close approximation of the life-cycle behavior of female
labor supply, which increases in the years when children attend school and decreases sharply
before retirement. This pattern is similar in all skill classes but the pro¯le is very steep in the
low-skill class while it is fairly °at in the high-skill class. Of course, this re°ects the di®erences
in the numbers of children.
14Table 3: Female labor market participation rates (FLMP)
Germany
20-33 34-53 54-64 Total 2007a
Low-skill (s = 1) 54.1 64.1 26.9 51.4 56.7
Medium-skill (s = 2) 67.8 87.0 58.4 73.7 75.1
High-skill (s = 3) 76.5 96.5 78.1 85.6 84.4
Total 65.9 82.8 53.9 70.5 69.7
Germany 2006b 61.0 73.0 45.0 { {
Source: aOECD(2009c), bStaBu (2009c).
5 Simulation results
This section presents our simulation results for the small open economy.6 The ¯rst subsection
discusses alternative reforms of the family bene¯t structure whereas the second subsection
concentrates on reforms of the tax system. In order to quantify the impact of a changing family
policy on macroeconomic variables and welfare, we compute a new long-run equilibrium after
the introduction of alternative policy reforms and compare it to the initial equilibrium discussed
in Tables 2 and 3. In all simulations we assume a constant general government expenditure
per capita, a constant debt-to-output ratio and balance the public budget by adjusting the
consumption tax rate.
In order to separate the short-run (i.e. where the adult population structure is constant) from
the long-run consequences when the population structure has adjusted, we split each reform
simulation into two scenarios. In the ¯rst scenario we adjust the immigration rate ¹ ´ in order
to keep the aggregate population growth rate of the economy constant. Then we simulate the
same reform with an unaltered immigration rate. In this scenario a change in native fertility
a®ects the aggregate population growth rate of the economy so that the long-run population
structure changes. The latter has a direct impact on pay-as-you-go ¯nanced social security and
also on the structure of public consumption and tax revenues.
5.1 Reform scenarios for family bene¯ts
With respect to direct and indirect family bene¯ts we consider three di®erent policy reforms.
First we increase the direct monetary transfers bc by roughly 25 percent. We compare this
reform with an alternative policy that increases the per capita outlays for in-kind bene¯ts by the
6We have also simulated the reforms in a closed economy, but the resulting repercussion e®ects from changing
factor prices are not signi¯cant. Simulation results are available upon request.
15same amount. If public care facilities for pre-school age children and schoolchildren increase,
children stay at home less so that time costs for their mothers decrease. Consequently, we
assume in this scenario that the time costs for a pre-school child fall from 8 to 4 percent and
the time costs for a pupil decrease from 5 to 2.5 percent of the available time. While both
initial reforms imply an increase of per capita transfers to families, the third experiment keeps
the aggregate bene¯ts per child constant but changes their structure. In this case the increase
of in-kind bene¯ts from the second policy reform is combined with an equivalent reduction in
direct transfers per child. Table 4 reports the changes of some central variables.
Table 4: Fertility, macro and welfare e®ects of child and in-kind bene¯t reforms
Child bene¯t increase In-kind bene¯t increase Bene¯t structure reform
short-run long-run short-run long-run short-run long-run
Fertility rates
TFR 1.82 1.79 1.92 1.88 1.52 1.52
TFR(1) 2.58 2.50 (28) 2.54 2.46 (26) 1.83 1.82 (-7)
TFR(2) 1.66 1.62 (21) 1.77 1.74 (30) 1.44 1.43 ( 7)
TFR(3) 1.24 1.26 (14) 1.47 1.49 (34) 1.33 1.33 (20)
Macroeconomic e®ectsa
´ + ¹ ´ 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.1
bcM=Y 1.8 1.8 1.1 1.2 -0.6 -0.5
Gc=Y 0.9 0.9 2.0 2.0 0.8 0.8
¿c 4.1 3.1 5.3 4.2 0.8 0.6
¿ 0.0 -3.9 0.0 -4.8 0.0 -0.8
A (p.c.) 3.0 0.1 0.9 -2.7 -1.8 -2.2
Lf (p.c.) -10.8 -5.0 -8.9 -1.7 1.7 2.9
Lf(1)(p.c) -31.0 -21.4 -16.5 -4.2 17.6 19.6
Lf(2)(p.c) -13.6 -5.0 -10.0 0.1 2.6 4.3
Lf(3)(p.c) -4.6 -2.2 -6.4 -3.2 -2.0 -1.4
Lm (p.c.) 0.0 3.3 0.0 4.1 0.0 0.7
Y;L (p.c.) -3.1 0.9 -2.6 2.4 0.5 1.3
Welfare e®ectsb
W(1) -0.63 0.99 -1.32 0.67 -0.43 -0.03
W(2) -1.73 -0.05 -2.00 0.00 -0.24 0.14
W(3) -1.82 -0.15 -2.14 -0.14 -0.30 0.08
aChange in percentage points. bAs a percentage of the present value of remaining resources.
p.c. per capita
When we increase child bene¯ts in the left part of Table 4, the total fertility rate rises signif-
icantly from 1.46 to 1.82 in the short-run. However, this increase di®ers substantially in the
three skill classes. As one would expect, child bene¯ts have a very strong impact on low-skilled
households whose total fertility rate TFR(1) increases from 1.96 to 2.58 children (i.e. by 28
percent). At the same time, high-skilled families increase fertility only slightly from 1.11 to
161.24 children (i.e. by 14 percent). Child bene¯ts rise due to the reform from 3.0 to 4.8 percent
of GDP. About half of this increase is due to the direct e®ect of higher bene¯ts (with a constant
number of children) and the other half is due to the increase in the number of children. Of
course, when the number of children rises, in-kind bene¯ts have to increase as well. Due to
higher outlays on children the consumption tax rate has to increase by 4.1 percentage points.
At the same time, social security contributions remain constant in the short-run, since the
population structure is not altered. Implicitly, the reform transfers resources from old age,
when consumption is high, towards younger ages when households have children. Therefore,
savings per capita increase, which (at least) partly neutralizes government policy. Due to higher
fertility, aggregate female labor supply (measured in hours worked) falls by almost 11 percent.
Of course, the reduction in hours worked depends on age and skill level. While high-skilled
women reduce their labor supply by only 4.6 percent, low-skilled women reduce labor supply by
31 percent. Similarly, Table 5 reveals that participation rates of young women in the low-skill
class fall by 8.4 percentage points from 54.1 to 45.7 percent, while they decrease for the elderly
in the top-skill class only by 0.7 percentage points from 78.1 to 77.4 percent. The reduction in
female employment induces an out°ow of capital so that output decreases by about 3 percent.
Not surprisingly, higher taxes and the reduction of per capita output induce a welfare loss for
all households. Note, however, that high-skilled households are hurt the most due to their lower
fertility.
The next column displays the long-run e®ects where we keep immigration constant so that the
aggregate population growth rate increases after the reform. Consequently, the dependency
ratio decreases from 36.4 to 29.3 percent, which in turn reduces the social security contribution
rate by 3.9 percentage points. The change in the population structure reduces the consumption
share of GDP and increases the investment share. Nevertheless, the long-run consumption tax
rate is lower than the one in the short-run for two reasons. First, now the government has to
run a de¯cit in order to keep the debt-to-output ratio ¯xed. Second, the share of general public
consumption in GDP falls since output per capita increases while the government consumption
per capita remains constant. The output per capita increases due to higher male and female
employment per capita.7 Lower tax and contribution rates have a positive impact on welfare.
Consequently, long-run welfare for low-skilled households increases by roughly one percent of
resources, while middle-skilled and high-skilled households lose slightly.
The middle part of Table 4 reports the consequences of an equivalent increase in in-kind ben-
e¯ts which reduces child-related costs for mothers. Consequently, in-kind bene¯ts relative to
GDP now increase by 2.0 percentage points while direct monetary transfers to households only
increase by 1.1 percentage points due to the rise in the number of children. In our calibration,
7Male labor supply is ¯xed but the change in the population structure increases per capita male employment.
17this reform increases aggregate fertility rates even more strongly compared to the previous
simulation. In contrast to the last reform, the fertility rate of the high-skilled class increases
even more strongly than that of the low skilled class (i.e. 34 percent vs. 26 percent). Note
that aggregate female labor supply falls by a lesser amount in both the short- and the long-run.
Only high-skilled women work signi¯cantly less than before since they have more children. As
shown in Table 5, participation rates of women are now signi¯cantly higher than in the previ-
ous simulation. Especially middle-aged women with children attending school work more than
before. Due to higher fertility, consumption taxes have to increase compared to the previous
simulation, so that welfare losses in the short-run are higher in all skill-classes.
Considering the long-run e®ects in the fourth column of Table 4, the aggregate population
growth rate now amounts to 0.9 percent. Again, the increase in consumption taxes is more
than balanced by the fall in social security contribution rates. The labor supply now increases
much more strongly so that the output per capita rises by 2.4 percentage points. Finally,
low-skilled families bene¯t from such a reform while the high-skilled lose slightly in the long
run.
In the right part of Table 4 we combine an increase of in-kind bene¯ts with an identical reduction
of direct child bene¯ts per child. As a consequence, child bene¯ts decrease now by roughly 0.5
percentage points, while in-kind bene¯ts increase from 3 percent to 3.8 percent of GDP. Not
surprisingly, the rise in total fertility is only modest, since now especially high-skilled women
increase childbirth while low-skilled families even reduce childbirth compared to the benchmark
situation in Table 2. Therefore, aggregate population growth in the last column only rises by
0.1 percentage points. Since changes in tax and contribution rates are only small, government
policy now mainly transfers resources within younger cohorts. As a consequence of the increased
available time, female labor supply rises in the short and the long run quite signi¯cantly by 1.7
and 2.9 percent, respectively. As shown in Table 5, female participation rates at middle ages
increase in all skill classes but especially for low-skilled women who have fewer children. The
higher employment reduces aggregate savings so that capital in°ows increase while long-run
output per capita rises by 0.5 and 1.3 percent. Therefore, similar as in Apps and Rees (2004)
or in Da Rocha and Fuster (2006), our model allows to generate a joint increase in fertility and
female employment by adjusting the family bene¯t structure. However, as one can see in the
lower part of Table 4, such a policy may have some distributional costs. In the long run, mainly
middle- and high-skilled families bene¯t from such a reform while low-skilled households are
slightly hurt.
18Table 5: Changes in long-run female labor market participation rates (FLMP)
Child bene¯t increase In-kind bene¯t increase
20-33 34-53 54-64 Total 20-33 34-53 54-64 Total
Low-skill (s = 1) -8.4 -17.9 -9.7 -12.0 -6.1 -6.1 -6.5 -5.3
Medium-skill (s = 2) -6.0 -4.5 -2.4 -4.3 -3.4 -2.2 -2.0 -2.4
High-skill (s = 3) -4.4 -0.9 -0.7 -2.2 -0.6 -0.2 -1.4 -0.8
Total -6.3 -7.3 -4.0 -5.9 -3.6 -2.9 -3.1 -2.9
Bene¯t structure reform Family taxation
20-33 34-53 54-64 Total 20-33 34-53 54-64 Total
Low-skill (s = 1) 3.3 9.6 4.4 6.5 0.8 3.5 -8.7 0.4
Medium-skill (s = 2) 1.7 1.1 -0.3 1.0 0.4 -3.5 -9.5 -3.4
High-skill (s = 3) 1.9 0.6 -0.7 0.7 -1.9 -1.3 -4.0 -2.2
Total 2.2 3.2 0.8 2.4 0.0 -1.3 -8.2 -2.2
Individual taxation/
Individual taxation In-kind bene¯t increase
20-33 34-53 54-64 Total 20-33 34-53 54-64 Total
Low-skill (s = 1) 1.5 16.1 17.4 11.7 -5.4 14.7 21.1 10.1
Medium-skill (s = 2) 7.4 9.2 7.4 8.0 9.0 8.9 10.2 9.4
High-skill (s = 3) 11.8 2.3 3.7 5.4 7.9 1.5 4.8 4.3
Total 6.6 9.7 9.3 8.5 5.0 9.0 12.0 8.6
All changes in percentage points.
5.2 Tax reform scenarios
The existing system of jointly taxing married couples in Germany has been under critique for
quite some time. First, it has strong negative incentive e®ects for the second earner, since
marginal income tax rates are identical for both partners in marriage. In this view there is a
direct link between the income tax system and the low labor force participation rate of married
women in Germany. Second, the system is not an adequate means of family policy since it
subsidizes married couples and not families with children. For both political and constitutional
reasons it seems very unlikely that Germany introduces a system of individual taxation in the
near future. Nevertheless, various reform proposals with respect to family taxation have been
put forward recently. This section compares two alternatives. More speci¯cally, we consider
a system of \Family taxation" such as practiced in France, which comprises splitting factors
for each spouse equal to 1 (as in Germany) and additional splitting factors of 0.5 per child
for the ¯rst and the second child and 1 for each additional child. We contrast the reform
towards the French tax system with two alternatives which yield signi¯cantly higher income
tax revenues. In the scenario \Individual taxation" both family members are taxed separately,
19while in the scenario \Individual taxation/In-kind bene¯t increase" the higher tax revenues
from individual taxation are used to increase in-kind bene¯ts for children as described in the
previous section. Table 6 reports the simulation results of the experiments with alternative
family taxation reforms.
Table 6: Fertility, macro and welfare e®ects of family tax reforms
Individual taxation/
Family taxation Individual taxation In-kind bene¯t increase
short-run long-run short-run long-run short-run long-run
Fertility rates
TFR 1.76 1.76 1.23 1.26 1.69 1.67
TFR(1) 2.00 1.97 ( 0) 1.77 1.84 ( -6) 2.39 2.32 (19)
TFR(2) 1.72 1.72 (28) 1.09 1.10 (-18) 1.50 1.49 (11)
TFR(3) 1.56 1.58 (42) 0.91 0.89 (-20) 1.26 1.27 (14)
Macroeconomic e®ectsa
´ + ¹ ´ 0.0 0.7 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5
bcM=Y 0.8 0.9 -0.6 -0.6 0.4 0.4
Gc=Y 0.8 0.9 -0.6 -0.6 1.0 1.0
¿c 3.6 3.0 -3.9 -2.6 0.4 -0.5
¿ 0.0 -3.6 0.0 3.4 0.0 -2.7
Ac 8.4 6.2 1.6 2.1 2.1 0.6
Lf (p.c.) -12.4 -7.4 22.1 16.3 13.1 17.7
Lf(1) (p.c.) 4.3 12.9 42.9 29.9 25.3 34.8
Lf(2) (p.c.) -14.5 -7.6 22.9 15.8 13.1 18.9
Lf(3) (p.c.) -13.0 -10.6 17.7 14.6 11.2 13.5
Lm (p.c.) 0.0 3.1 0.0 -2.9 0.0 2.3
Y;L (p.c.) -3.6 0.1 6.4 2.7 3.8 6.7
Welfare e®ectsb
W(1) -1.45 0.08 1.68 -0.22 0.47 1.78
W(2) -1.45 -0.02 2.17 0.38 0.21 1.49
W(3) -1.64 -0.20 2.15 0.39 0.08 1.35
aChange in percentage points. bAs a percentage of the present value of remaining resources.
p.c. per capita
The introduction of child splitting factors as in the French income tax system reduces income tax
revenues signi¯cantly, so that the consumption tax rate has to be increased by 3.6 percentage
points in the short run. However, such a tax system also generates higher fertility. Since
income tax reductions rise with income, especially high-skilled families increase the number
of children. Higher fertility rates now result in direct child bene¯ts and in-kind bene¯ts to
increase by the same amount. Compared to the previous subsection, aggregate savings now
increase much more strongly since mainly high-skilled families bene¯t from the redistribution
towards younger cohorts. As before, aggregate employment and output fall due to the reduction
20in female labor supply. Note that adjustment is asymmetric across skill classes. Low-skilled
women with two children increase labor supply in young ages since their marginal tax rate
may fall to zero due to the reform. Medium- and high-skilled women increase fertility and
reduce their hours worked and participation rates signi¯cantly. Surprisingly, families from the
high-skilled class are hurt the most despite the fact that they bene¯t the most per child. Since
this class has the highest fraction of childless families, their total (average) tax bene¯t might
be still smaller than that for low-skilled families. The latter even gain slightly in the long
run, when the higher fertility rate a®ects the whole economy. In this case the social security
contribution rate decreases by 3.6 percentage points and per capita output rises slightly. For
high-skilled families the negative e®ects from higher consumption taxes still dominate so that
they experience a welfare loss even in the long run.
The introduction of individual taxation shifts the tax burden from elastic female labor supply
towards the inelastic male labor supply. As a consequence, aggregate female labor supply
increases by more than 22 percent in the short run. Again, the three skill classes react quite
di®erently. Low-skilled women hardly change their fertility behavior. They increase their labor
supply the most, especially when the children are older or have already left the house, see Table
5. Medium- and high-skilled women signi¯cantly reduce the number of their o®spring so that
they can work more especially at younger ages. Due to higher tax revenues, the consumption
tax rate could be reduced by almost 4 percentage points. This already takes into account the
reduction in fertility rates which in turn reduces bene¯ts for families signi¯cantly. The rise in
employment induces capital in°ows so that output increases in the short run by 6.4 percent.
The reduced labor market distortions increase welfare roughly by 1.7 percent of resources in the
short run. Of course, the fall in fertility increases the contribution rate of the pension system in
the long run. Consequently, employment is reduced again in all skill classes.8 The low-skilled
now experience a welfare loss while the medium- and high-skilled realize signi¯cant long-run
welfare gains.
In the last simulation of Table 6 we combine the introduction of the individual tax system
with an increase in in-kind bene¯ts as in the previous section. Since the additional income
tax revenues are not su±cient to cover the cost increase, the consumption tax rate has to rise
by 0.4 percentage points in the short run. This combination yields a simultaneous increase
in fertility and female employment. In the short run female labor supply increases by more
than 13 percent and the fertility rate increases to almost 1.7 children per woman. Note that
especially low-skilled women work more and have more children. Table 5 shows that their
8The long run changes in participation rates and hours worked of 8.5 (in percentage points) and 16.3 (in
percent), respectively, are roughly in line with the 4.85 percentage points and 11.4 percent computed in Steiner
and Wrohlich (2004). However, the latter study applies a partial equilibrium microsimulation model and allows
for a joint labor supply reaction of both spouses after a switch towards individual taxation.
21participation rates at young ages fall but increase signi¯cantly at older ages. Medium- and
high-skilled women also have more children, but they also work signi¯cantly more at young
ages. Due to the reduced contribution rate, the long-run increase in female employment is
even higher than the short run e®ect. Finally, all skill classes experience welfare gains. In the
long run they amount to roughly 1.5 percent of aggregate resources. Low-skilled families are
signi¯cantly better o® since they bene¯t the most from the fall in tax rates and the increase in
family bene¯ts. Consequently, our simulation results con¯rm the theoretical analysis of Apps
and Rees (2004) who also ¯nd a simultaneous increase of female employment and fertility after
a revenue neutral switch towards individual taxation.
6 Summary and discussion
The present paper attempts to introduce a simulation model that captures the central elements
of the joint decision of female labor supply and fertility. In a dynamic framework, adult couples
decide each period on consumption, female labor supply and, during fertile years, whether
or not to have an additional child in the following period. We apply the so-called \male
chauvinist" assumption, i.e. the wife is assumed to adjust her labor supply to that of the
husband. According to our model, the diversion of time away from the labor market into child
care within the household results in a loss of job-related human capital for the woman. At the
same time there is an option for families to raise children in government provided child care
facilities in order to alleviate the joint labor supply and fertility choice.
With respect to family policy our simulations indicate three central results. First, higher direct
or indirect transfers to families may increase the total fertility rate, but they also reduce female
labor supply. Main bene¯ciaries are low-skilled families since they have many children. Second,
the introduction of individual taxation signi¯cantly increases female employment by more than
16 percent, but it further reduces fertility rates especially of medium- and high-skilled women.
As a consequence, long-run welfare of low-skilled households deteriorates while medium- and
high-skilled experience welfare gains of almost 0.4 percentage points. Finally, a joint increase
in female employment and fertility is possible if the government provides additional child care
facilities. If the latter are ¯nanced by a reduction of direct family transfers, the fertility increase
is extremely modest and it may hurt especially low-skilled households. If additional outlays are
¯nanced by the introduction of individual taxation, fertility and employment increase signi¯-
cantly, all households realize long-run welfare gains which amount to more than one percent of
available resources. Due to having more children, low-skilled households bene¯t signi¯cantly
more than high-skilled.
Of course, one has to be careful to take the model too serious and draw too many policy con-
22clusions from the reported quantitative results. Despite its complexity the model structure still
abstracts from many real world features that are very important for fertility and female labor
supply decisions. We consider uncertainty only with respect to childbirth whereas employment
is always certain. In future work we plan to follow Da Rocha and Fuster (2006) and model
labor market search and uncertainty of future employment opportunities. In addition, we will
follow Fehr, Kallweit and Kindermann (2009) and disaggregate the family structure in order
to distinguish between families and singles and couples with di®erent skill-combinations. As in
Fehr et al. (2009) it might also be interesting to derive the joint labor supply of both spouses
and to consider a home production technology. Finally, it is important to consider the transi-
tion between steady states in order to quantify the initial impacts of the considered policies in
the right way. All these extensions would make the model structure more realistic. Most likely
they would dampen our quantitative results but hardly change our qualitative ¯ndings.
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